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The  mirroring  hypothesis  predicts  that  the  organizational  patterns  of  a  development  project  (e.g. 
communication  links,  geographic  collocation,  team  and  firm  co-membership)  will  correspond  to  the 
technical patterns of dependency in the system under development. Scholars in a range of disciplines have 
argued  that  mirroring  is  either  necessary  or  a  highly  desirable  feature  of  development  projects,  but 
evidence pertaining to the hypothesis is widely scattered across fields, research sites, and methodologies. 
In this paper, we formally define the mirroring hypothesis and review 102 empirical studies spanning 
three  levels  of  organization:  within  a  single  firm,  across  firms,  and  in  open  community-based 
development projects. The hypothesis was supported in 69% of the cases. Support for the hypothesis was 
strongest in the within-firm sample, less strong in the across-firm sample, and relatively weak in the open 
collaborative sample. Based on a detailed analysis of the cases in which the mirroring hypothesis was not 
supported, we introduce the concept of actionable transparency as a means of achieving coordination 
without mirroring. We present examples from practice and describe the more complex organizational 
patterns that emerge when actionable transparency allows designers to ‘break the mirror.’  
 
 
Keywords:  Modularity,  innovation,  product  and  process  development,  organization  design,  design 
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The Mirroring Hypothesis: Theory, Evidence and Exceptions 
 
   
1    Introduction 
Innovation is a process in which people define problems and then actively develop new knowledge to 
solve  them  (Nonaka,  1994).    In  the  modern  economy,  much  new  knowledge  takes  the  form  of  new 
product and process designs. Modern efforts to develop new designs in turn require the coordination of an 
ever wider range of disciplines, embodied in technologically and functionally sophisticated systems and 
artifacts (Brusoni et al., 2007).   
Given  the  well-known  challenges  of  coordinating  complex  interdependent  tasks  (e.g.  Thompson, 
1967: Galbraith, 1977: Williamson, 1971: Arrow, 1974), theorists have tended to predict (or recommend) 
that the formal structure of a development organization will (or should) “mirror” the design of a system 
under development (e.g., von Hippel, 1990; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; 
Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). These theories in turn lead to an empirically 
testable  prediction:  the  organizational  ties  of  a  development  project  (e.g.  communication  links, 
geographic collocation, team and firm co-membership) will correspond to the technical dependencies in 
the system under development.  
This basic idea has different names in different fields. In organization design, it can be seen as an 
application of task contingency theory to product design and development (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1977; Tushman, 1979; Drazin and Van deVen, 1985; Tushman and Nadler, 
1997). In computer science, it is known as Conway’s Law (Conway, 1968), and it has recently been 
called  “socio-technical  congruence”  (Cataldo  et.  al.,  2008).  Notably,  the  hypothesis  predicts 
correspondence  but  does  not  impose  a  direction  of  causality:  effects  may  flow  from  organizational 
structure  to  technical  design  (Henderson  and  Clark,  1990);  from  technical  design  to  organizational 
structure (Chandler, 1977); or in both directions (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Fixson and Park, 2007). 
A thorough understanding of the evidence for and against the mirroring hypothesis is difficult to 
achieve. The relevant literature is scattered across a number of fields in management, economics, and 
engineering, and there are significant differences in how the hypothesis is interpreted in the different 
streams  of  literature.  Accordingly  this  study  makes  two  contributions.    First,  it  formally  defines  the 
mirroring hypothesis and systematically reviews and summarizes the empirical evidence pertaining to it. 
Second, it synthesizes observations from studies that contradict the hypothesis to explain when and how 
development organizations can “break the mirror.” 
Our  analysis  proceeds  as  follows.  In  Section  2,  we  trace  the  intellectual  roots  of  the  mirroring 
hypothesis and then formally define it in terms of network graphs. Building on this theoretical base, in 
Sections  3  and  4,  we  systematically  review  the  empirical  evidence  pertaining  to  the  hypothesis.  We THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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consider 102 empirical studies, most of which were published between 2000 and 2009. The studies are 
divided into three groups by organizational level of analysis: (1) development projects within a single 
firm (22 studies); (2) projects spanning two or more firms (62 studies); and (3) projects undertaken by 
open collaborative communities (18 studies). We classify each study according to whether its results fully 
or partially support or fail to support the mirroring hypothesis.  
Across the entire sample, the mirroring hypothesis received support (including partial and mixed 
support) in just over two-thirds (69%) of the cases. The hypothesis was more strongly supported in the 
within-  and  across-firm  groups  (77%  and  74%  respectively)  than  in  studies  of  open  collaborative 
development projects (39%). Cases contradicting the hypothesis in turn were of two types: (1) in four 
cases  collocated,  richly  communicating  groups  developed  designs  made  up  of  largely  independent 
components; and (2) in twenty-eight cases independent and dispersed contributors collaborated on highly 
interdependent designs.  
The first type of exception already has a theoretical explanation: a collocated, richly communicating 
group can create a system of independent components or modules by adhering to design rules that impose 
independence and information hiding across the technical components (Parnas, 1972; Mead and Conway, 
1980; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). By contrast, the second set of exceptions poses a deeper theoretical 
challenge.  In traditional development organizations, people have relied on face-to-face communication, 
physical  collocation,  and  formal  authority  to  coordinate  highly  interdependent  design  tasks.    The 
paradigmatic form of organization for developing an interdependent design is a highly interactive team, 
working in close proximity, employed by a single firm (Allen, 1977; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Sanchez 
and Mahoney, 1996; Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). However, the large number 
of counter-examples revealed by our study raises the question, how are interdependent design decisions 
and tasks coordinated in the absence of face-to-face communication, physical collocation, and formal 
authority?  
To  answer  this  question,  in  Section  5,  we  take  a  closer  look  at  the  twenty-eight  cases  in  which 
independent contributors developed highly interdependent designs. We find that in all such cases the 
contributors (1) had compatible motivations and no severe conflicts of interest with respect to the ultimate 
use of the design; (2) worked in or created a framework that gave them expectations of good faith and 
some  protection  from  harmful  actions  by  other  contributors;  and  (3)  worked  to  maintain  a  shared 
understanding  or  “common  ground”  with  respect  to  the  design  (Clark,  1996;  Srikanth  and  Puranam, 
2007). Common ground was sometimes created using analogues of traditional organizational ties—e.g., 
electronic  communication,  temporary  collocation,  and  status-based  authority.  But  we  also  find  that 
independent contributors often coordinated their efforts implicitly by using development tools that made 
the design-in-progress both transparent and actionable for all members of the group. THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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The  concept  of  actionable  transparency,  discussed  in  Section  6,  captures  the  extent  to  which 
everyone with an interest in improving a given design has the right and the means to act on it.  The 
concept traces back to Zuboff (1988), who observed that when digital archives constitute a near-perfect 
surrogate  for  the  activities  that  generated  them,  access  to  those  archives  provides  observers  with 
“universal transparency” into what others are doing (pp. 315, 356-361). Actionable transparency requires 
not just that people can access and make sense of source materials, but that they can also act upon an 
evolving design. We argue that actionable transparency can serve as a substitute for direct ties between 
designers, and in its presence, more complex relationships between system design and organizational 
structure may emerge in lieu of genuine mirroring.  
Section 7 summarizes the findings of this paper and concludes.  
 
2    What Is the Mirroring Hypothesis? 
The literature that pertains to the mirroring hypothesis commonly draws on two distinct sources for its 
motivation:  (1)  the  literature  on  organization  design  and  organizations  as  complex  systems  (e.g., 
Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1974; Weick, 1976) and (2) the literature on product design and products as 
complex systems (e.g. Alexander, 1964; Parnas, 1972, 1978; Ulrich, 1995). Both traditions make use of 
the concept of modularity described next. 
Scholars in the organization-design tradition usually attribute the concept of modularity to Simon 
(1962, 1981), who used the parable of Hora and Tempus to illustrate the advantage of partitioning a 
complex problem into parsimoniously linked sub-problems: 
Hora ... put together subassemblies of about ten elements each. ... Hence, when Hora 
had to put down a partly assembled watch…he lost only a small part of his work, and he 
assembled his watches in only a fraction of the man-hours it took Tempus. (Simon, 1981, 
p. 188) 
By partitioning the watch into subassemblies, Hora made it easier to cope with the complexity of creating 
a watch. At the system level, Simon called the property of being divisible into loosely linked subsystems 
“near-decomposability.”  
Scholars  in  the  product-design  tradition  take  inspiration  from  Simon,  but  also  refer  to  works  by 
Alexander (1964) and Parnas (1972, 1978).  Like Simon, Alexander (1964) argued that it is easier to cope 
with  the  complexity  of  a  large-scale  problem  if  it  is  decomposed  into  parsimoniously  linked  sub-
problems.  Parnas  (1972,  1978)  stressed  the  benefits  of  parallelism,  arguing  that  it  is  easier  to  split 
development  work  across  a  group  if  people  can  work  independently  and  in  parallel.  To  support 
parallelism,  Parnas  encouraged  developers  to  avoid  sharing  assumptions  and  data.    Specifically,  he 
contended that every developer’s task assignment, or product module, should be “characterized by its 
knowledge of a design decision that it hides from all others” (1972: p. 1056).  THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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Information hiding is a fundamental principle underlying the mirroring hypothesis.  With information 
hiding, each module is informationally self-sufficient, hence can be designed independently of the rest of 
the system.  This means that independent individuals, teams or firms can separately design different 
modules, yet the modules will work together as a whole (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). As a result, there will 
be a one-to-one mapping from designers (or design teams) to modules (Parnas, 1972, 1978). This one-to-
one  mapping  in  turn  allows  us  to  formally  state  the  mirroring  hypothesis  in  terms  of  a  structural 
correspondence between two networks, one technical and one organizational. 
Following Simon (1981), we define the elementary components of a design as decisions about design 
parameters,  or,  equivalently,  the  tasks  of  making  such  decisions.  The  technical  architecture  of  a 
development project captures “what depends on what” in terms of these design decisions or tasks.  It is 
the  scheme  by  which  the  system’s  functions  and  sub-functions  are  allocated  to  distinct  components 
(nodes in a network), plus a description of the dependencies (links) between components (Suh, 1990; 
Ulrich,  1995;  Baldwin  and  Clark,  2000; Whitney  et.  al.,  2004). Design  component  dependencies  are 
relationships of the form “if the design of Component 1 changes, the design of Component 2 may need to 
change as well” (Parnas 1972, 1978; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). 
The division of labor captures “who does what.”  It is the scheme by which the design decisions (or 
tasks)  are  allocated  to  people  or  teams  (nodes),  along  with  the  organizational  ties  (links),  such  as 
communication,  collocation,  or  firm  co-membership,  between  those  people.    Finally,  the  division  of 
knowledge  captures  “who  knows  what.”    It  is  the  scheme  by  which  design-relevant  information  is 
apportioned to designers or teams (nodes) and transferred among them (links). 
The mirroring hypothesis posits that, in the design of a complex system, the technical architecture, 
division of labor and division of knowledge will “mirror” one another in the sense that the network 
structure of one corresponds to the structure of the others. To visualize what this means, we can represent 
the technical and organizational networks using matrices.   
For the technical architecture, a design structure matrix (DSM) shows the network of dependencies 
among the design components (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; see also Donald Steward, 1981, and Eppinger, 
1991). Consider a product with N component design decisions.  To construct its DSM, we let the rows 
and columns of an N ×N matrix denote those decisions.  Then we set the values in the matrix to capture 
the dependencies between design decisions: the value of matrix cell dij is ‘x’ if and only if a change in j 
may require an adaptive change in i. For example, figure 1 depicts a design with three components such 
that Component 2 depends on Component 1, and there are no other dependencies. The heavy lines in the 
figure group the components according to their dependencies. 
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Figure 1    A Design Structure Matrix 
 
The DSM captures dependencies among components in a design, but it does not show who does what, 
nor how they coordinate their work.  We introduce the labor-knowledge structure matrix (L-KSM) for 
these purposes. (It would be more precise to represent the interactions of people and knowledge in two 
matrices,  but  to  simplify  the  exposition,  we  have  collapsed  them  into  one.)
1  The  L-KSM  begins  by 
assigning a person or team to each design task and labeling each cell on the main diagonal accordingly. 
For  example,  for  the  design  depicted  in  figure  1,  suppose  Alice  designs  Component  1,  Bob  designs 
Component 2, and Carol designs Component 3. In a separate 3x3 matrix with similar rows and columns, 
we place the uppercase letters A, B and C along the main diagonal as shown in figure 2. These task 
assignments indicate which agents have primary knowledge of which components: Alice knows about the 
design of Component 1, Bob knows about 2, and Carol knows about 3.  
 
Figure 2    A Labor-Knowledge Structure Matrix (corresponding to the DSM in Figure 1) 
 
The mirroring hypothesis predicts that, given the dependencies between their design components, 
Bob and Alice will share one or more explicit organizational ties that enable them to share the requisite 
                                                         
1 Cataldo et al. (2006) and Sosa (2008) presented a different approach to capture the division of labor.  We use the approach above because 
it allows us to illustrate the mirroring hypothesis as simply as possible.  
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design information. We denote the (presumptive) presence of an organizational tie between Alice and 
Bob, by placing the notation “ab” in Alice’s column and Bob’s row. By comparison, Carol shares no 
design  component  dependencies  with  Alice  or  Bob,  thus  the  mirroring  hypothesis  predicts  no 
organizational ties for her.  More generally, the mirroring hypothesis predicts that the DSM and L-KSM 
will have entries in the same cells. The structure of one will correspond to the structure of the other, as 
can be seen by overlaying figure 2 on figure 1. 
 Formally defining the mirroring hypothesis in terms of the correspondence between two networks, 
one technical and one organizational, allows us to specify an ideal test of the hypothesis. In the ideal test, 
researchers would collect data on the dependencies between the design components and separately collect 
data on task assignments and organizational ties between designers. Measurable organizational ties might 
take  the  form  of  (1)  firm  co-membership;  (2)  geographic  collocation;  or  (3)  formal  and  informal 
communication. With such data in hand, the researchers could then test to see whether the presence (or 
absence) of a technical dependency was correlated with the presence (or absence) of a given type of 
organizational  tie.  High  correlation  between  technical  dependencies  and  organizational  ties  would  be 
evidence in favor of the mirroring hypothesis: low correlation evidence against the hypothesis.  
Of the studies we surveyed (discussed below), three provided data that permitted this “ideal type” of 
test (Sosa et. al., 2004; Kratzer et. al., 2008; Bird et. al., 2008). All other studies fell short of the ideal in 
some way. In the absence of “ideal tests”, we might conclude that there is little or no empirical evidence 
for  or  against  the  mirroring  hypothesis.  However,  we  believe  that  this  interpretation  is  overly 
conservative. As described below, we were able to identify 102 separate studies, in a wide range of 
settings,  in  which  both  design  dependencies  and  organizational  ties  were  observed  and  their 
correspondence  assessed  in  a  rigorous  quantitative  or  qualitative  fashion.  Each  study  constitutes  an 
observation of a case in which the mirroring hypothesis might or might not hold. Thus, even though there 
are  few  ideal  tests,  there  is  a  large  and  widespread  body  of  empirical  evidence  pertaining  to  the 
hypothesis. We believe it is worthwhile to examine this evidence critically, summarize it statistically, and 
identify commonalities and differences among the separate studies. We turn to this task next. 
 
3   Empirical Evidence on the Mirroring Hypothesis 
In this and the following section, we report the results of a survey and synthesis of the empirical 
evidence pertaining to the mirroring hypothesis. We first describe how we obtained and analyzed our 
sample and present an overview of the results. We then discuss in greater detail the findings for three 
subgroups corresponding to three different levels of organization. 
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3.1    Sample Selection and Methodology 
To identify our sample, we first conducted an electronic search for relevant scholarly works across 
the full digital publication lives of 19 major journals spanning multiple disciplines.  These journals are 
listed in Table 1.  To cast a wider net for the nascent literature on open collaborative development, we 
repeated the search using the ACM Portal’s Guide to Computing Literature.  We used a broad set of 
keywords to perform the search:  these appear in Table 2. 
 
Table 1     Journals included in the initial search for empirical evidence 
Academy of Management Journal   Journal of Management Studies 
Academy of Management Review   Journal of Product Innovation Management 
Administrative Science Quarterly   Management Science 
California Management Review   Managerial and Decision Economics 
Harvard Business Review   Organization Science 
IEEE Engineering Management Review   Organization Studies 
IEEE Software   Research in Engineering Design 
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management   Research Policy 
Industrial and Corporate Change   Strategic Management Journal 
Industry and Innovation   
 
Table 2    The keyword string used in the initial search for empirical evidence 
( (modular OR modularity OR “product architecture”) AND “division of labor” ) OR 
( (modular OR modularity OR “product architecture”) AND “organizational structure” ) OR 
( (modular OR modularity OR “product architecture”) AND “industry structure” ) OR 
( (modular OR modularity) AND “open source” ) OR “task partitioning” 
 
We filtered the original search results in two steps.  First, we examined titles and descriptions to 
remove duplicates, “non-results” (e.g. bibliographies, editors’ commentaries, book reviews), unsuitable 
articles (e.g. pure theory works, directions for future research, experiments and simulations, technical 
“white papers”), and unrelated articles (e.g. empirical studies in the natural sciences).  Next, we examined 
the abstracts of all 141 remaining candidates and removed another 35 due to lack of direct relevance (e.g. 
the article investigated organizational structure or product architecture but not both).   
After this initial filtering, we expanded the sample in two ways.  First, in a snowball type search, we 
scanned the retained articles for relevant studies that were not yet included.  We also added studies with 
which we were familiar.  The resulting sample included 130 articles and books, but only 129 separately 
classified  studies,  since  some  works  contained  more  than  one  study  and  others  contained  duplicate 
discussions  of  the  same  study.  Of  these,  127  were  scholarly  works;  two  were  books  describing  the 
personal experiences of the chief architect of a development project (Mead and Conway, 1980; Colwell, THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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2006). We believe the two studies based on personal experience constitute valid empirical observations, 
but our results would not be significantly affected by their exclusion. 
Figure  3  shows  the  distribution  of  works  by  publication  year.    It  shows  a  substantial  growth  in 
academic  interest  in  the  mirroring  hypothesis,  with  the  mean  number  of  works  per  year  more  than 
doubling from 7.4 in 2000-2004 to 16.5 in 2005-2008. 
 
Figure 3    The distribution of works by publication year
2 
     
 
We reviewed the full contents of the 129 studies in the surviving set. We found that 27 did not have 
sufficient data to correlate technical dependencies with organization ties, and dropped these from the 
sample. As indicated, three studies contained evidence to support an “ideal type” of test; 99 studies fell 
short  of  the  ideal,  but  still  provided  evidence  on  the  degree  of  correspondence  between  technical 
dependencies in the design and the organizational structure of the development organization. Thus our 
sample comprises 102 unique development projects. Although large, the survey is not exhaustive: some 
relevant studies undoubtedly escaped our net. Nevertheless, the sample is broad-based and (we believe) 
representative of scholarly empirical work through the middle of 2009.  
We examined and coded the studies’ research designs and results to facilitate cross-comparisons. In 
particular,  we  noted  whether  the  methodology  employed  was  primarily  quantitative  (e.g.,  statistical 
correlation  of  design  dependencies  with  organizational  variables  such  as  outsourcing/insourcing)  or 
qualitative  (e.g.,  interviews  or  surveys  of  perceived  correlations  between  design  dependencies  and 
organizational variables). A detailed description of the data, organized by study, is available as an online 
                                                         
2 Since we collected the data mid-way through 2009, we do not include 2009 in the figure.  The sample included nine scholarly works 
published between January 2009 and May 2009. THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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appendix <link>. Works included in our final sample are indicated by an asterisk (*) in the references 
section of this paper. 
As indicated, we divided our sample into subgroups according to the level of organization being 
studied: within firm, across firm, and open, community-based projects. Of the 102 studies, more than half 
(61%) were across-firm studies, and the remainder split almost evenly between the within-firm (22%) and 
open collaborative (18%) groups. 
We evaluated each study in terms of the question, “Does the study provide empirical support for the 
mirroring hypothesis? ”  We classified studies using the following categories:  
•   “Yes” denotes that a study’s results uniformly supported the mirroring hypothesis—that is, it either 
(1) showed strong congruence between organizational ties and technical dependencies; (2) found 
performance  advantages  associated  with  congruence;  or  (3)  found  performance  disadvantages 
associated with lack of congruence. 
•  “No”  denotes  that  a  study’s  results  contradicted  the  mirroring  hypothesis.  This  category  was 
further divided into two subcategories as follows. 
Type 1:  Contributors  with  rich  organizational  ties  (e.g.,  face-to-face  communication, 
collocated, belonging to the same within-firm team) successfully developed a modular 
technical system with largely independent parts; and 
Type 2:  Contributors  with  few  or  no  organizational  ties  (e.g.,  communicating  under 
constraints,  physically  and  temporally  separated,  employed  by  different  firms) 
successfully collaborated on a highly interdependent design. 
•   “Partial”  denotes  that  a  study’s  results  provided  partial  support  for  the  mirroring  hypothesis. 
These cases, which mostly appeared in the across-firm subset of the sample, tended to show that 
mirroring is not an absolute yes-or-no proposition. For example, a company might modularize its 
technical designs, but not go so far as to split the corresponding business units into separate firms. 
Or a firm operating as a systems integrator might adhere to a strict modular partitioning of design 
responsibilities, but still promote information sharing (not information hiding) across the modules. 
•  “Mixed  ”  denotes  that  some  parts  of  the  study  supported  the  mirroring  hypothesis  and  others 
challenged it. 
 
3.2    Overview of Results 
Table  3  summarizes  the  results  of  our  analysis  broken  down  by  level  of  organization  and 
methodology. It shows that, across the entire sample, mirroring is a common pattern but by no means 
universal. Looking at the last two columns of the table, if we count the “Partial” and “Mixed” categories 
as essentially supportive of mirroring, then a little more than two-thirds (69%) of the studies in the sample THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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supported the hypothesis. Support is strongest in the within-firm group, with 68% clearly supportive and 
10% partial or mixed. It is less strong in the across-firm group, with 47% clearly supportive and 28% 
offering partial or mixed results. Finally, in the open collaborative group, only 28% of the studies clearly 
support the hypothesis; 11% provide partial support; and 61% contradict it.  
 
Table 3     Results broken down by level of organization and methodology  
 
Importantly, the results within each group do not change significantly if we break down the studies 
according to the methodology employed. In the across-firm group, qualitative studies provide somewhat 
less  support  for  the  hypothesis  than  quantitative  and  mixed  studies,  but,  given  the  small  numbers 
involved, the distributions are not significantly different. Thus we conclude that the results are robust with 
respect to methodological differences.  
Thirty-two (out of 102) studies in our sample did not support the mirroring hypothesis. In four cases, 
contributors with rich organizational ties created modular systems made up of independent components. 
However, the bulk of the exceptions (28 out of 32) were cases in which contributors with few observable THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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organizational  ties  worked  collaboratively  to  perform  highly  interdependent  design  tasks.  Such  cases 
constituted all of the exceptions in the across-firm and open collaborative subsets of our sample. Table 4 
summarizes these results: 
 
Table 4   Summary of results: The “non-supportive” category is split between Type 1 (contributors 
with rich organizational ties develop a modular system with independent components) and Type 2 




4   Results within Each Group  
This section describes our detailed findings within each group. 
 
4.1    Within-firm Results 
In the within-firm group of studies, developers are employees of a single firm, thus by definition 
share one organizational tie. Accordingly this literature focuses on the patterns of communication and 
collocation within a product development organization. The basic contentions are that the organizational 
and geographic boundaries of teams should coincide with the technical boundaries of product components 
and that communication patterns between individuals and teams should coincide with the dependencies 
between components.   
The within-firm literature generally assumes that developers are compatibly motivated but cognitively 
bounded—that  is,  it  stresses  the  problem  of  coordination  over  cooperation.    The  organization’s  key 
problem  is  that  developers  will  inevitably  experience  unintended  information  asymmetries  as  a 
consequence  of  their  bounded  abilities  as  information  processors  (March  and  Simon,  1958).  
Communication then becomes a central concern. If developers fail to communicate on critical design 
issues,  there  are  two  ways  to  fix  the  problem:  (1)  redesign  the  product  to  reduce  the  need  for 
communication (e.g., by standardizing component interfaces); or (2) redesign the organization to facilitate 
communication (e.g., by collocating developers).  Either way, there should be an isomorphic relationship THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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(mirroring) between developers’ communication patterns and the technical architecture of the product 
under development (Conway, 1968; Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
As  indicated,  the  mirroring  hypothesis  was  strongly  supported  in  the  within-firm  studies  in  our 
sample. Indeed, a notable fact about this group of studies is that, in virtually all cases, the authors’ intent 
was  not  to  test  the  hypothesis  per  se.  Instead  the  studies  focused  on  how  to  achieve  and  maintain 
congruence (mirroring) between product and organization (e.g. Mead and Conway, 1980; Baldwin and 
Clark, 2000: Ch. 7; Cleidson et al., 2004; Colwell, 2006; Amrit and van Hillegersberg, 2008). The cases 
supporting the hypothesis showed that mirroring is desirable, but usually difficult to achieve and maintain 
(e.g., King, 1999; Herbsleb and Mockus, 2003; Cataldo et al., 2006; Cataldo et al., 2008; Gokpinar, 2007; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Morelli et al., 1995; Herbsleb and Grinter, 1999a, 1999b; Ovaska et al., 
2003; Sosa et al., 2004; Amrit and van Hillegersberg, 2008; Srikanth and Puranam, 2007, 2008).  
One study offered partial support for the hypothesis. In a study of 207 acquisitions by large firms, 
Puranam  et.  al.  (2009)  found  (consistent  with  mirroring)  that  acquisitions  with  technologies  directly 
relevant to the acquirers’ product line were more likely to be integrated into the acquirer’s organization, 
whereas acquisitions with “stand-alone” technologies were more likely to continue as separate business 
units. However, when there were high levels of common knowledge (measured by overlapping patents) 
between target and acquirer, this correlation was significantly weaker. Thus common knowledge appeared 
to reduce organizational-technical mirroring to some extent. 
A  study  by  Sosa  et.  al.  (2004)  offered  mixed  support  for  the  hypothesis.  Here,  consistent  with 
mirroring,  the  dependencies  among  technical  subsystems  generally  corresponded  to  the  patterns  of 
communication  between  subsystem  development  teams.  However,  contra  the  hypothesis,  it  was 
sometimes  necessary  for  teams  developing  independent  subsystems  to  consult  with  each  other  over 
system-wide issues. This study was one of the three “ideal-type” studies, which directly compared the 
network structure of design dependencies and organizational ties. The microscopic nature of observations 
in this study may have led to more complex and nuanced findings than would arise in studies with less 
precise data.  
The within-firm group also provided five clear exceptions to the mirroring hypothesis. Four were 
what we call “Type 1,” that is, cases in which a collocated, highly interactive team within a single firm 
designed a modular system made up of independent components. For example, Lehnerd (1987) described 
how, through an intense collaborative effort across functional units, Black and Decker redesigned its 
product line as a family of modular products assembled from standardized components. In the realm of 
software,  MacCormack  et.  al.  (2006)  described  how  a  single,  interactive  and  collocated  team  within 
Netscape  redesigned  the  Mozilla  browser  in  a  way  that  significantly  reduced  the  codebase’s  internal 
interdependencies and increased its modularity. Such efforts require rigid adherence to design rules to THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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prevent the modularity of the system from breaking down through bilateral negotiations and coordination 
between module teams (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). 
Finally a study by Srikanth and Puranam (2007, 2008) constitutes the lone “Type 2” exception in the 
within-firm sample. This study looks at software development undertaken by geographically dispersed 
developers. In 3 of 22 projects, there were few cross-location dependencies, consistent with the mirroring 
hypothesis.  However,  contra  mirroring,  19  projects  exhibited  high  levels  of  interdependence  across 
geographic locations. Cross-location interdependencies could not be eliminated because of organizational 
rigidities  (e.g.,  programmers  could  not  be  relocated),  technological  legacies,  and  in  some  cases  the 
newness of the system under development.  
 
4.2    Across-firm Results 
In the across-firm literature, developers are distributed across two or more firms, thus by definition, 
some lack the organizational tie of firm co-membership. This literature seeks to determine whether the 
distribution of design work across firms corresponds to the underlying pattern of technical dependencies. 
Specifically, do firm boundaries coincide with module boundaries in the technical architecture? And are 
formal transactions located where technical dependencies are sparse (Baldwin, 2008)? The theoretical 
arguments  supporting  the  hypothesis  proceed  as  follows:  To  make  interdependent  contributions  to  a 
product’s  design,  people  must  exchange  information  openly  and  resolve  design  conflicts  efficiently 
(Monteverde,  1995).    Two  well-known  schools  of  thought,  transaction  cost  economics  and  the 
knowledge-based theory of the firm, suggest that conflict resolution and information exchange are more 
easily accomplished within a firm than across firms.  
Transaction cost economics (TCE) focuses on the resolution of conflicts of interest. It assumes that 
the key problem for organizations is to align incentives so that exchanges can take place with minimal 
risk  of  opportunistic  behavior  like  hold  up  or  reneging  (Williamson,  1985).    Such  holdups  are  most 
damaging when there is a high level of dependency between upstream and downstream agents, i.e., when 
one or the other lacks an outside option. This in turn argues for allocating interdependent design decisions 
to agents within a single firm. The TCE approach also stresses the ability of hierarchical organizations 
(firms) to use formal authority to resolve conflicts (Williamson, 1999).  
In  contrast,  the  knowledge-based  theory  of  the  firm  (KBT)  assumes  that  the  key  problem  for 
organizations is to facilitate flows of information and assemble requisite stocks of knowledge. Relative to 
markets,  firms  have  superior  capacity  for  central  planning  (Alchian  and  Demsetz,  1972)  and  rich 
contextual communication (Arrow, 1974; Monteverde, 1995). For example, Nickerson and Zenger (2004) 
argue that, when problems are fully decomposable, several independent firms can efficiently work in 
parallel,  coordinated  by  markets.  However,  as  the  sub-problems  become  interdependent  and  non-THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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decomposable,  it  is  more  efficient  to  bring  the  search  process  within  the  purview  of  a  single  firm. 
Marengo and Dosi (2005) use a formal model of search on an NK landscape (Kaufmann, 1993) to arrive 
at similar conclusions.  
Notably,  although  they  emphasize  different  organizational  problems,  the  transaction  cost  and 
knowledge-based perspectives arrive at the same conclusion vis a vis mirroring.  Effective across-firm 
collaboration, it is argued, requires a modular technical architecture with information hiding. Clearly 
delineated task boundaries and codified interface standards are needed to make formal transactions and 
third-party  dispute  resolution  cost-effective.  For  this  reason,  it  is  more  efficient  to  consolidate 
interdependent design tasks within a firm than to distribute them across firms (Teece, 1996; Baldwin and 
Clark 2000: Ch. 14; Langlois, 2002; Baldwin, 2008). Thus, consistent with mirroring, the boundaries of 
firms will correspond to (mirror) the modules in the technical architecture. (Causality may run in either 
direction, from technical architecture to firm boundaries or from firm boundaries to architecture.)  
Recent  contributions  to  the  across-firm  theoretical  literature  do  not  challenge  the  mirroring 
hypothesis, but rather add new concerns to prior theoretical arguments. For example, Veloso and Wolter 
(2008) point out that obsolescence risk and the need to preserve outside options create forces causing 
fragmentation: as a result, firms and industries experiencing modular or radical innovations may have a 
propensity to break apart. Helfat and Campo-Rebado (2009) show that vertically integrated firms may 
choose to stay integrated even when the underlying technical system is modular, if they anticipate that the 
designs will become reintegrated at a later date.  
Across-firm  studies  form  the  largest  group  in  our  sample,  numbering  62.  Of  these,  47%  fully 
supported the hypothesis; 23% offered partial support; and 5% provided mixed support. Of the studies 
supportive of the hypothesis, one important subset involved macroscopic, longitudinal analysis of an 
industry  or  industry  segment.    These  longitudinal  studies  in  turn  told  two  stories.    In  one,  the  focal 
industry initially consisted of vertically integrated firms developing technically integrated products. Then 
a new modular architecture emerged and became the “dominant design” (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; 
Tushman  and  Murmann,  1998;  Murmann  and  Frenken,  2006).  The  structure  of  the  industry  swiftly 
changed to mirror the new product architecture, with different firms focused on developing different 
modules of the product. The products examined in these studies included stereo systems (Langlois and 
Robertson, 1992), computers (Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Baldwin and Clark, 2000: Ch. 1, 14-15), 
bicycles (Galvin and Morkel, 2001), autos (Ro et al., 2007), banking products and services (Jacobides, 
2005; Consoli, 2005), and fantasy role-playing games (Lecocq and Demil, 2006).  The second story runs 
the  opposite  way:  the  focal  industry  initially  consisted  of  specialist  firms  developing  modular 
components. Then a new integral “dominant design” emerged. The structure of the industry subsequently 
changed to mirror the integral product architecture, with individual firms developing integrated products. THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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Firms lacking the capacity to integrate were often forced to exit the industry. The products examined in 
these studies included bicycle drivetrains (Fixson and Park, 2008) and building facilities (Cacciatori and 
Jacobides, 2005). 
Other  studies  supportive  of  mirroring  focused  on  more  microscopic  levels  of  analysis,  including 
individual sourcing decisions (e.g., Monteverde, 1995; Novak and Eppinger, 2001; Parmigiani, 2007), 
supplier-alliance  decisions  (e.g.,  Gulati  et  al.,  2005;  Sahaym  et  al., 2 007;  Tiwana,  2008a,  2008b), 
outsourcing (e.g., Wüllenweber, 2008), and product innovation events (e.g., Shibata et al., 2005).  These 
studies generally found that greater levels of component complexity and interdependence were correlated 
with  higher  probabilities  of  vertical  integration  and/or  poorer  performance  among  “outsourcers”  than 
“insourcers.” 
Fourteen studies (23%) provided partial support for the mirroring hypothesis. These in turn fell into 
two subgroups. In the first, mirroring was observed between the technical architecture of the system and 
the division of labor, but not between divisions of labor and knowledge (e.g., Prencipe, 1997, 2000; 
Takeishi, 2001, 2002; Brusoni, 2005; Brusoni et al., 2001; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Tokumaru, 2006; 
Kapoor and Adner, 2009). As Brusoni et. al. (2001) observed, some firms “know more than they make.” 
Hence, studies in this group support the mirroring hypothesis insofar as they show groups of firms relying 
on  modular  divisions  of  labor  to  develop  modular  products,  but  they  also  qualify  the  hypothesis  by 
showing that firms may depend, not on information hiding, but on information sharing, to coordinate their 
joint efforts. 
The second subgroup included studies where firms responded to product modularity by shifting their 
internal organizational structure in the direction of mirroring, but did so within pre-existing boundaries 
(e.g., Hoetker, 2006; Jacobides and Billinger, 2006; Gomes and Joglekar, 2008; Parmigiani and Mitchell, 
2009).  These studies support the mirroring hypothesis in that they show firms responding to greater 
product modularity with greater organizational modularity, but they also show that firms do not equate the 
decision to modularize with decisions to divest or outsource. A firm may create a technical architecture 
with few dependencies across modules and few ties between organizational units, but still keep all units 
beneath the same corporate umbrella.  
Three  across-firm  studies  (5%)  fell  into  the  “Mixed”  category.  These  all  provided  evidence  that 
technical modularity reduced the need or the frequency of cross-firm communication. However, each case 
also revealed alternative mechanisms of coordination across firms. In one case, Grunwald and Kieser 
(2007) found that cross-firm communication was reduced by product modularization (consistent with 
mirroring), but also by systems that helped developers locate and share information. In a second case, 
Kratzer  et.  al.  (2008)  found  that  the  technical  architecture  changed  over  time,  but  patterns  of 
communication were less flexible, hence the degree of mirroring was only moderate in each phase of THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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development. Langner and Seidel (2009) also found temporal instability in patterns of mirroring: the focal 
firm developed highly modular technical specifications to support contract negotiations with external 
suppliers (consistent with mirroring), however, once the contract was awarded, the buyer-supplier pair 
switched to a pattern of rich, frequent information sharing across firm boundaries. 
Finally,  sixteen  studies  (26%)  were  not  supportive  of  the  mirroring  hypothesis.  All  exceptions 
involved separate firms that collaboratively co-designed interdependent systems or sub-systems.  The 
products examined in these studies included autos (e.g., Clark, 1989; Helper et al., 2000; Takeishi, 2001; 
Mikkola,  2003;  Sako,  2004),  aircraft  and  related  products  (e.g.,  Argyres,  1999;  Miller  et  al.,  1995), 
building facilities (e.g., Barlow, 2000), software (e.g., Staudenmeyer et al., 2005; Srikanth and Puranam, 
2007, 2008), machines and systems for manufacturing (e.g., Bonaccorsi and Lipparini, 1994), computers 
and computer sub-systems (e.g., Scott, 2000), and semiconductors (e.g., Appleyard et al., 2008). We 
describe how these firms managed their collaborations in Section 5 below. 
 
4.3    Open Collaborative Results 
In an open collaborative development project, product design information, such as software source 
code, is placed in the public domain.  Different individuals and firms contribute voluntarily to the design, 
according to their own private needs and interests; they self-select their contributions without relying on 
managers or market prices to guide them (Raymond 1998, 2001; Benkler 2002; von Hippel and von 
Krogh, 2003; Weber 2004; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2009).  
In the open collaborative setting, most developers lack the organizational ties of firm co-membership 
and collocation. Their opportunities for face-to-face communication are highly restricted or sometimes 
non-existent.  Because  open  collaborative  developers  are  highly  decentralized  and  geographically 
dispersed, scholars have predicted (consistent with mirroring) that they will design modular systems made 
up of largely independent components (e.g. Moon and Sproull, 2000; Kogut and Metiu, 2001; Benkler, 
2002; Gacek and Arief, 2004; Fitzgerald, 2005, 2006; Fitzgerald and Ågerfalk, 2005; German, 2005; 
Lerner and Tirole, 2001, 2002; Osterloh and Rota, 2007). In addition, the mirroring hypothesis predicts 
that contributors will tend to specialize on particular modules and not range over all parts of the system. 
The most striking finding in the open collaborative portion of the sample was the small number of 
studies that clearly supported the predictions of the mirroring hypothesis  (5 studies or 28%) versus the 
larger number that clearly challenged it (11 studies or 61%). The numbers are too small to be definitive, 
but the evidence to date indicates that many open collaborative groups do not design particularly modular 
systems. Furthermore open collaborative groups do not as a general rule divide labor and knowledge 
along the lines defined by the technical system’s modular architecture. Thus the groups do not display THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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classic  mirroring  (based  on  information  hiding),  even  when  they  use  a  modular  architecture  for  the 
technical system under development.  
The most interesting cases in this branch of the literature involved large groups working together to 
develop large systems.  In these cases (15 out of 18) there was usually some measure of product and task 
modularization, but it was neither uniform nor complete.  Instead, the most common pattern was one in 
which the developer community self-organized into a “core” group that made numerous large and small 
contributions across the entire system and a peripheral group that made smaller contributions within the 
more modular parts of the system (e.g., Mockus et al., 2000, 2002; Koch and Schneider, 2002; von Krogh 
et al., 2003). 
In summary, the mirroring hypothesis was upheld in the majority of studies in our sample. However, 
the cases contradicting the hypothesis call for further investigation. This is our task in the next section. 
 
5     When and How Do Organizations Break the Mirror? 
As indicated, the correspondence between technical dependencies and organizational ties predicted by 
the mirroring hypothesis can break down in two ways. On one hand, contributors with rich organizational 
ties may develop a modular product consisting of largely independent components. On the other hand, 
contributors with highly constrained organizational ties may make interdependent contributions to the 
design of a single technical system or sub-system. 
The first set of exceptions to the mirroring hypothesis has theoretical antecedents in the engineering 
and product design literatures. Creating a modular system can be an explicit design goal for an individual, 
team, or firm. Descriptions of how to create modular systems are found in works by Bell and Newell 
(1971), Parnas (1972, 1978), Mead and Conway (1980) and others. Basically, the designers must have 
prior knowledge of all implicit or potential dependencies in the technical system to be designed. They can 
then systematically remove dependencies between modules by establishing design rules (Baldwin and 
Clark, 2000: pp. 63-86). Thus in theory nothing prevents a tight-knit team or an individual with adequate 
knowledge  from  creating  a  design  made  up  of  largely  independent  components.  (In  practice,  strict 
adherence to design rules may be hard to achieve.) 
The  second  and  larger  set  of  exceptions,  in  which  independent  and  dispersed  contributors  make 
highly interdependent contributions to the same design, raises deeper theoretical questions. As discussed 
in Section 2, the conventional approach to coordinating interdependent design tasks relies on a tight-knit 
organizational  structure  involving  rich  and  unstructured  interpersonal  communication,  physical 
collocation, and authority-based planning and oversight.  Scholars generally perceive some or all of these 
organizational  conditions  to  be  essential  for  effective  coordination.  Nevertheless  the  evidence  in  the THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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studies we reviewed shows that in a significant percentage of cases, people can and do make highly 
interdependent design contributions without these organizational supports.   
When we looked more closely at the data, we were able to identify three conditions common to all 
exceptions of the second type. First, the developers had mutually compatible motivations and essentially 
no  major  economic  conflicts  of  interest  with  respect  to  the  design.  Second,  they  operated  within 
frameworks  that  gave  them  reason  to  expect  good  faith  and  protected  them  from  malicious  or 
unintentional harm by co-contributors. Last but not least, they established and maintained a common 
ground from which they shared design information and acted on the evolving design. We discuss each of 
these conditions in sections below. 
 
5.1     Compatible Motivations 
Independent contributors collaborating on highly interdependent design problems exhibited similar 
motivations for doing so.  In all cases, the participants faced resource constraints and thus had the need or 
a keen desire to access capabilities or resources they did not have themselves.  Additionally, in some 
cases, the participants faced a non-decomposable technological problem, while in others, the participants 
were developing a brand-new technology whose inherent interdependencies were unknown.  
Facing  constraints  on  resources  or  resource  mobility,  individual  designers  and  managers  were 
motivated to work across firm or organizational boundaries to gain access to external capabilities.  For 
example, Henkel (2006) found that firms contributed privately developed source code to an open-source 
software product (embedded Linux) in the hope of drawing complementary contributions from others in 
the form of bug fixes, code improvements, and code maintenance. In another case, Srikanth and Puranam 
(2007, 2008) discovered that managers of software projects (at two firms) faced a plethora of resource 
mobility constraints.  Developers were geographically dispersed and could not be relocated. Yet a client 
might  require  developers  to  collaborate  with  third-party  vendors,  or  impose  strict  security  provisions 
regarding  which  developers  could  access  its  resources.  Such  constraints  precluded  a  clean  mapping 
between the technical architecture of products and the geographic and administrative boundaries of the 
teams working on them.  
In  addition,  independent  collaborators  working  on  interdependent  designs  did  not  have  strong 
economic  conflicts  of  interest.    Sometimes  in  the  open  collaborative  setting,  the  participants  were 
competing for a prize, but in such cases, the prize was something of low economic value, for example, a 
T-shirt (Gulley, 2001, 2004; Gulley and Lakhani, 2009).  
Some cases involved a non-decomposable technological problem (e.g., Miller et al., 1995, Argyres, 
1999; Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009).  The development of the B-2 “Stealth” Bomber (Argyres, 1999) is 
a case in point.  Because no one firm had all the capabilities and resources needed to develop the aircraft THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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independently, the US Air Force awarded separate contracts to five different firms.  However, due to the 
exacting technical requirements associated with achieving “stealth,” the designs of the different firms had 
to fit together in exceptionally complex and precise ways—thus, the technology inherently “demanded” 
richly connected contributions. 
Other cases involved new—and thus uncertain and poorly understood—technologies (e.g., Brusoni et 
al., 2001; Takeishi, 2001, 2002; Mikkola, 2003; Appleyard et al., 2008; Garud and Munir, 2008).  The 
ongoing development of “next-generation lithography” (NGL) technology in the semiconductor industry 
(Appleyard  et  al.,  2008)  is  an  example.    Industry  leaders,  such  as  Lucent,  IBM,  and  Intel,  formed 
multiple,  firm-spanning  consortia  that  advanced  novel  NGL  technologies  by  coordinating  “an 
unprecedented level of interorganizational cooperation” (p. 419). 
 
5.2 Frameworks Supporting Good Faith 
In  virtually  all  exceptional  cases,  we  found  that  collaborating  contributors  interacted  within 
frameworks that enhanced expectations of good faith and protected the contributors from malicious harm. 
The frameworks included formal contracts, long-term relationships, and open-source licensing schemes. 
These  frameworks  helped  independent  contributors  cultivate  opportunities  for  mutual  gains  from 
collaboration by clarifying the terms of exchange and also by fostering expectations of reciprocal good 
faith. In some cases, the frameworks did not exist at the time the collaboration began, but grew into place 
over time. In effect, participants invested in risky alliances in the expectation that their investments would 
pay off. (See Scott, 2000 and Gilson et. al., 2009 for examples.) 
In  our  sample,  contracts  came  in  two  forms:  lateral–dyadic  and  hierarchical–multilateral.    In  the 
lateral–dyadic form, pairs of firms signaled their intentions to behave in good faith by contracting with 
one another directly. In such cases, relationship-specific investments and experiences generally fostered 
expectations of good faith.  The supplier relationships of Honda, Nissan, and Toyota (Sako 2004) are 
cases in point.  The automakers cultivated their suppliers’ willingness to share knowledge by investing 
their own resources in their suppliers’ capabilities: they created teaching programs to replicate their in-
house capabilities at suppliers’ facilities, and they set clear rules for sharing the resulting financial gains 
cooperatively.  In  another  case  studied  by  Gilson  et  al.  (2009),  Apple  and  SCI  entered  a  contract 
committing  the  two  firms  to  jointly  assess  the  feasibility  of  each  other’s  innovations.  The  contract’s 
enforceable portion consisted of a three-year commitment by Apple to purchase parts manufactured by 
SCI  to  remunerate  SCI  for  purchasing  Apple’s  manufacturing  facilities.    However,  the  contract  also 
contained unenforceable sections, which, the authors argue, were designed to build the firms’ knowledge 
of each other’s capacity for good faith collaboration and dispute resolution (Gilson et al., 2009: p. 466). THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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In the hierarchical–multilateral form of contracting, multiple contributors signaled their intentions to 
behave in good faith by contracting with a common sponsor or system integrator.  For example, recall the 
case of the B-2 “Stealth” Bomber discussed above (Argyres, 1999). To meet their respective contractual 
obligations to their military client, the firms involved voluntarily cooperated with each other.  
While relationship-specific investments and experiences play an important role in open collaborative 
projects (see, for example, Mockus et al., 2000 and von Krogh et al., 2003), open-source licensing affords 
further support for cooperation in that setting.  For example, Garud et al. (2008: pp. 357-358) described 
the role played by the General Public License (GPL) in the growth of Linux as an open collaborative 
project: 
A key development was Torvalds’ decision to release the kernel under [the terms of 
the] General Public License (GPL), which mandated that any user modifying or adding to 
the source code would have to make their own contributions available to everyone else 
(Stallman 1999).  This decision…facilitated the establishment of a stable “generalized 
exchange system” (Kollock 1999) in which people both contributed to and benefited from 
the assistance of others. 
In other words, the terms of the license provided “the legal and cultural basis” (p. 359) for the cooperation 
that followed. 
 
5.3    Common Ground 
To build on each other’s work in the context of an interdependent design, developers require a shared 
understanding, or “common ground” (Clark, 1996; Srikanth and Puranam, 2007, 2008), regarding (1) how 
to  codify  and  interpret  product  design  information  and  (2)  what  channels  and  protocols  to  use  for 
exchanging and discussing design information.  In other words, contributors need to be able to “speak the 
same language” in terms of how they explain and interpret designs. They also need to be able to anticipate 
when, where, and how to look for design information from their counterparts.   
In some cases in our sample, contributors lacked sufficient common ground at the outset of the design 
process, but subsequently invested time and effort to develop it.  The development of the windshield 
wipers  sub-system  of  the  Chrysler  Jeep  Cherokee  (Mikkola  2003)  is  an  example.    Chrysler  initially 
outsourced  the  development  of  wipers  using  a  modular  design  approach  with  explicit  interface 
specifications.  The supplier, which had not worked with Chrysler before, developed its first design in 
isolation  based  on  the  specifications.  Unfortunately,  the  supplier  did  not  understand  some  of  the 
specifications, the design failed, and the supplier had to start over “from scratch” (p. 449). In the second 
(and successful) design effort, the two firms acted to increase the flow of technical information across 
their  boundary:  “Face-to-face  meetings…daily  phone  calls,  etc.  became  a  habit”  (p.  450).  Sharing 
technical information in this way allowed the engineers at both firms to develop and maintain a common, 
accurate understanding of the evolving product design. THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
 
  21 
In the exceptional cases, we found that the mechanisms used by collaborating groups to share design 
information fell in two classes: (1) those that were analogues of traditional organizational ties; and (2) 
those that constituted a genuine departure from tradition.  The analogues to traditional organizational ties 
included broadband electronic (instead of face-to-face) communication, temporary physical collocation, 
and status-based planning and dispute resolution. These devices created a set of direct, though informal 
organizational ties between designers. (For examples, see in the across-firm case: Clark, 1989; Bonaccorsi 
and Lipparini, 1994; Miller et al., 1995; Andersen, 1999; Barlow, 2000; Grimaldi and Torrisi, 2001; 
Mikkola, 2003, Sako, 2004; Brusoni, 2005; Herbsleb et al., 2005; Staudenmayer et al., 2005; Dibiaggio, 
2007; Grunwald and Kieser, 2007; Gilson et al., 2009; in the open collaborative case: Mockus et al., 
2002; Elliot and Scacchi, 2004; Garud et al., 2008).   
In other cases, however, independent contributors did not develop as many direct ties, but coordinated 
their efforts implicitly, via shared product design and development tools. In these cases, transparency and 
direct  involvement  with  the  design  served  as  a  partial  or  complete  substitute  for  direct  ties  between 
designers.  (For  examples,  see  in  the  across-firm  case:  Argyres,  1999;  Andersen,  1999;  Scott,  2000; 
Herbsleb et al., 2005; Grunwald and Kieser, 2007; in the open collaborative case: Mockus et al., 2000; 
Yamauchi et al., 2000; Gulley, 2001, 2004; Gutwin et al., 2004).   
In the next section, we explain how design transparency and especially actionable transparency can 
break the correspondence between technical architecture and organizational ties that lies at the heart of 
the mirroring hypothesis. 
 
6     Actionable Transparency 
In  The  Age  of  the  Smart  Machine,  Shoshana  Zuboff  (1988)  observed  that  the  increasingly 
information-based nature of industrial work has radically increased its “transparency.”  She argued that, 
when auto-generated archives constitute a near-perfect surrogate for the activities that generated them, 
access to those archives provides “universal transparency” into what others are doing (pp. 315, 356-361).  
In effect, anyone with access to the archives can “see” what’s going on without the benefit of direct input 
or assistance from others. There are in fact three different levels of transparency that collaborating groups 
can achieve.  Material transparency denotes the mere disclosure of information. Conceptual transparency 
requires not only that contributors can access the information, but also that they can make sense of it (cf. 
Wenger, 1990).  Finally, actionable transparency requires not just that they can make sense of it, but that 
contributors can act on the design itself (cf. West and O’Mahony, 2008). 
Clearly, material transparency is necessary but not sufficient for conceptual transparency (von Krogh 
et  al.,  2003;  West  and  O’Mahony,  2008).  Material  and  conceptual  transparency  do  not  imply 
actionability, however.  Just because a potential designer understands a design doesn’t mean she can act THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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on it. One level of actionability gives developers the right and means to customize their own private 
copies  of  the  design.  A  second  level  of  actionability  allows  developers  to  combine  their  individual 
changes with others’, in near real-time, while at the same time guarding against design conflicts and 
catastrophes. Thus the concept of actionable transparency captures the extent to which everyone with an 
interest in improving the design has the right and means to act on both his or her own copy and the master 
copy of the design.  
It is helpful to consider some examples of actionable transparency in practice.  In the across-firm 
literature, the B-2 “Stealth” Bomber project mentioned above provides one example (Argyres, 1999).  
The firms involved in the development process shared a system with five key features: (1) it stored all 
their design information in a shared database; (2) it allowed developers to view all design changes in 
near-real time; (3) it performed automated checks to ensure all data met rigid rules for how to codify 
design information; (4) it performed automated batch updates to ensure that all instances of a part were 
promptly and simultaneously updated; and (5) it enabled the use of automated tools for prototyping.  
Together these features allowed teams working separately at five different firms in different locations to 
develop highly interdependent part designs by relying primarily on the system itself to synchronize their 
efforts.   
Another  example  of  actionable  transparency—this  time  in  an  open  collaborative  setting—is  the 
MATLAB programming contests described by Gulley (2001, 2004) and Gulley and Lakhani (2009). Each 
contest requires entrants to use the MATLAB programming language to write a software program to 
solve a specific problem (e.g., calculating a Fibonacci number) as quickly as possible.  However, the 
contests also have the feature of actionable transparency: programmers can see each other’s code, adopt 
it, and modify it with no explicit constraints. As Gulley (2004: p. 20) explained: 
[T]he  unusual  feature  of  this  contest  is  that  contestants  submit  code  that  is 
immediately  scored,  ranked,  and  displayed  for  all  to  see.    In  fact,  ...  the  contest  is 
specifically designed to encourage participants to steal each other’s code. 
(Contestants do have norms as to what constitutes “fair play,” but these do not preclude using code 
created by others.) Observing the contest in action, Gulley found that contestants leveraged actionable 
transparency to make rapid, iterative changes to each other’s work.  In turn, the winning entry of each 
contest ultimately manifested the “tangled effort of dozens of people” (Gulley, 2004: p. 23; emphasis 
added). 
In practice, perfect actionability is rare: almost always, some controls are in place regarding who can 
change the master design. The need for such controls is reduced when there are automated checks to 
prevent malicious or unintentional damage, and backtracking schemes to allow previous states of the 
design to be recaptured. But even with controls in place, actionable transparency supports a level of 
interdependent collaboration that goes far beyond what is attainable via conceptual transparency alone.  THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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What does actionable transparency achieve that conceptual transparency cannot? As indicated at the 
start of this paper, innovation is a process in which people define problems and then draw on their stores 
of knowledge and generate new knowledge to solve those problems (Simon, 1981; Alexander, 1964). 
Much  design-relevant  knowledge  is  tacit  and  initially  inaccurate  (Nonaka,  1994),  consisting  of 
conjectures of the form: “if I change the design this way, these things will happen.” “This way” and 
“these things” are generally tacit hunches, which are not well articulated even in the mind of the designer 
(Bucciarelli,  1994).  Yet  if  a  design  is  actionably  transparent,  conjectures  of  this  type  can  be  tested, 
evaluated, and new conjectures generated quickly and efficiently. There is no need to make the conjecture 
comprehensible to another person or persuade someone else that a new idea is worth trying. Interactions 
between the designer and the design (embedded in a system of archives and test suites) are all that is 
needed to generate a new trial and new knowledge.  
Moreover, if a technical system is actionably transparent to several or many designers, experiments 
can go on in parallel and concurrently. The designers can then learn about and use each other’s changes 
via the system itself. (See Lakhani and von Hippel, 2009 on “optimistic concurrency” in open-source 
development.) This form of concurrent, recombinant experimentation creates a very rapid and powerful 
“generator-test”  cycle  (Simon,  1981)  or  “variation-retention-selection”  cycle  (Campbell,  1969).  Such 
cycles lie at the core of most evolutionary processes, including those found in theories of organizational 
change and evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Tushman 
and Rosenkopf, 1992; Nelson, 1995). Thus, in effect, actionable transparency is a form of “facilitated 
variation” that speeds up design evolution, increasing rates of innovation and improvement for the system 
as a whole (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Kirchner and Gerhart, 2005). 
Development groups that achieve actionable transparency through systems that provide immediate 
access to the design, rapid testing and feedback, and near-real-time updating do not require mirroring 
between the organizational structure and technical design to coordinate their joint efforts. To see this, it is 
helpful to return to the matrix representations of design and organizational structure introduced in Section 
2.    In figure 5, the leftmost matrix shows a hypothetical technical architecture in the form of a DSM. The 
system is fully interdependent, hence the DSM is fully filled in. Three agents, A, B and C, each design 
one component.  The second matrix shows the organizational ties needed if the design process were 
coordinated via mirroring. In order to resolve their design dependencies, each agent must give and receive 
information to and from every other agent, hence the structure of the L-KSM mirrors the structure of the 
DSM exactly. By comparison, the third matrix shows the structure of organizational ties if the design is 
made actionably transparent by embedding it in a shared information system. Each agent then gives and 
receives information to and from the system. The agents don’t need to interact directly because the system 
informs them—automatically and promptly—about what others have done. In this case, the organizational THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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ties (the L-KSM) do not mirror the technical architecture (the DSM) at all. (Note: we do not assume that 
the technical architecture causes the organizational structure or vice versa. If the technical architecture 
comes first, it can be supported by either form of organizational structure; if the organizational structure 
comes first, either type of L-KSM can give rise to a fully interdependent DSM.) 
 
Figure 5   Mirroring vs. actionable transparency 
 
The  cost  of  coordinating  an  organization  or  team  is  sometimes  equated  with  its  communication 
complexity, that is, the number of messages that must be passed between members in the course of getting 
the  work  done  (Brooks,  1975).  Mirroring  and  actionable  transparency  in  a  shared  system  have  very 
different  implications  for  communication  complexity.  Given  a  team  of  n  agents  working  on  a  fully 
interdependent design, the cost of coordination via mirroring is n
2 − n. For the same number of agents and 
design structure, the cost of coordination via actionable transparency falls to 2n: each agent only needs to 
manage his or her information exchanges with the system.  
In the presence of actionable transparency, it is common for more complex organizational patterns to 
emerge in lieu of genuine mirroring.  We describe these patterns below. 
 
6.1    Pseudo-alignment 
In an instance of pseudo-alignment, independent contributors develop a modular product without 
modularizing their division of labor.  At a macro level of analysis, an instance of pseudo-alignment may 
appear to support the mirroring hypothesis: a decentralized and distributed group will create a product 
consisting of largely independent components.  However, upon closer inspection, pseudo-alignment is not 
genuine  mirroring.    Instead  of  using  the  product’s  modular  architecture  to  delimit  their  tasks  and 
knowledge  (as  advised  by  Parnas,  1972),  the  contributors  use  modularity  to  divide  the  design  into 
relatively small and independent sub-problems. At that point, because of actionable transparency, any 
member of the group may advance a solution to any sub-problem. Thus if one traces “who does what” THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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within each module, instead of a proper modular division of labor with clear boundaries between the work 
of each contributor, one finds what Gulley (2004) called “the tangled efforts of dozens of people,” within 
each module of the system. 
 
6.2    Core/Periphery Alignment 
In  an  instance  of  core/periphery  alignment,  two  organizational  patterns  coexist:  there  is  a  small 
“core” group that (contra mirroring) makes contributions throughout the system, and a larger “periphery” 
of contributors who make contributions confined to individual modules.  The two groups differ in the way 
they  use  the  system’s  modularity.    Core  contributors  rely  on  modularity  to  reduce  the  cognitive 
complexity of their design tasks: However, they do not confine their contributions to specific modules, 
but range throughout the system. By contrast, peripheral contributors generally target specific features 
that  they  care  about,  which  are  well-encapsulated  within  modules,  hence  easy  to  modify  without 
triggering changes throughout the rest of the system. Accordingly, the contribution patterns of the core 
group tend to exhibit pseudo-alignment, while the contribution patterns of the periphery group tend to 
look more like genuine mirroring.  
While the patterns of pseudo-alignment and core-periphery alignment are especially common in the 
open  collaborative  setting, we  found  examples  elsewhere.    For  instance,  many  of  the  geographically 
distributed projects that Srikanth and Puranam (2007, 2008) studied appear to be instances of pseudo-
alignment.  Likewise, several other authors (e.g., Prencipe, 1997, 2000; Takeishi, 2001, 2002; Brusoni et 
al.,  2001;  Brusoni  and  Prencipe,  2006;  Tokumaru,  2006;  Kapoor  and  Adner,  2009)  studied  an 
organizational pattern that is a special case of core/periphery alignment, in which the core group is a 
single firm, or “systems integrator” (Brusoni et al., 2001), that uses a mix of “firm-like” mechanisms and 
actionable transparency to shepherd the efforts of module suppliers. 
 
7     Conclusion 
In this paper we have attempted to present a comprehensive view of the mirroring hypothesis. The 
hypothesis  predicts  that  there  will  (or  should)  be  a  correspondence  between  the  dependencies  in  the 
technical architecture of a complex system and organizational ties between the system’s designers. We 
began by formally defining the hypothesis, and then reviewed the empirical evidence for and against it at 
three levels of organization: within firm, across firms, and in open, community-based projects. Across all 
levels, we found much evidence to support the hypothesis, but also a significant number of exceptions 
that challenged the hypothesis. Support for the hypothesis was strongest in the within-firm sample, less 
strong in the across-firm sample, and relatively weak in the open collaborative sample. THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
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Exceptions  running  counter  to  the  mirroring  hypothesis  took  two  forms:  In  four  cases,  tight-knit 
teams developed modular systems made up of independent design components. In 28 cases, contributors 
with few observable organizational ties made highly interdependent contributions to the design of a single 
technical system or sub-system. The first set of exceptions can be explained using the theory of design 
rules. For the second set, we identified three conditions common to all cases: (1) compatible motivations; 
(2) frameworks supporting expectations of good faith; and (3) a shared understanding of the evolving 
design. We then looked at how the shared understanding was achieved. It was sometimes achieved by 
creating  “virtual”  organizational  ties:  electronic  (instead  of  face-to-face)  communication;  temporary 
collocation;  and  informal  and  status-based  authority.  However,  a  shared  understanding  can  also  be 
achieved  and  maintained  via  actionable  transparency.  Development  organizations  that  use  actionable 
transparency often exhibit more complex organizational patterns than simple mirroring, such as pseudo-
alignment and core-periphery alignment. 
This study is limited by sample and methodology. In terms of the sample, we cast a wide net by 
surveying  numerous  publication  outlets,  and  adding  works  known  to  us  or  brought  to  our  attention. 
However, it is impossible to construct a truly comprehensive sample. The second limitation lies in the fact 
that our methods of classification were necessarily subjective and more coarse-grained than the studies 
themselves. Many studies provided complex and nuanced views of the relationship between technical 
architecture and organizational structure. We are only able to describe the most common patterns, not all 
patterns.  
This study opens up several lines of future research. From a theoretical perspective, the concept of 
actionable transparency and its relationship with modularity needs to be better understood. Up to now, 
many scholars have assumed that modularity of a technical system and mirroring necessarily go hand-in-
hand.  However,  as  discussed  in  Section  6,  modularity  of  the  technical  system  can  also  support  high 
degrees of actionable transparency. A modular architecture reduces the cognitive burden on contributors, 
making problems smaller and encapsulating them so that changes to one part of the design do not trigger a 
host of secondary and tertiary changes. When combined with systems that support an ongoing shared 
understanding of the evolving design, modular architectures can lead to new relationships between the 
structure  of  the  technical  system  and  the  organizational  ties  between  developers.  Investigating  these 
relationships is a promising avenue for future research.  
In  conclusion,  the  traditional  solution  to  the  challenges  of  coordination  and  cooperation  in 
development  organizations  has  been  to  create  mirroring  between  the  structure  of  design  and  the 
organizational  ties  between  developers.  We  have  shown  mirroring  is  common  in  practice,  but  not 
universal.  Independent,  dispersed  individuals  and  firms  can  successfully  collaborate  on  highly 
interdependent development tasks if they have compatible motivations and expectations of good faith and THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS    JUNE 4, 2010 
 
  27 
can  maintain  a  shared  understanding  of  the  evolving  design.  Actionable  transparency  can  sustain  an 
ongoing shared understanding of a design amongst far-flung contributors, thus is an important means of 
collaboration in the digital age. 
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